Tuesday, August 5, 2008

Bloglines - NIST shows how to handle a toxics problem

Bloglines user ncaut (nc_aut@yahoo.com) has sent this item to you, with the following personal message:

yikes.


Angry Toxicologist

NIST shows how to handle a toxics problem

In Toxics

Oops!
In case you didn't know, the Boulder, CO site of the National Institute of Sandards and Technology (NIST) had an accidental spill of plutonium-239 on June 9 and the initial actions taken would have an industrial hygenist pulling her hair out (read more at C&EN). Basically, a guest researcher* cracked a bottle, didn't realize it, and when he did here's what he did: He locked up the sample, moved some of his materials, and washed his hands in the sink. As you might have guessed, he wasn't trained to work with radioactive substances, which is required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Basically this was the big mistake. NIST made some other mistakes; all the people in the lab were moved to the corridor and someone suggested that they take off their shoes so as not to spread the contamination but what they really did was end up contaminating their feet and socks too since the corridor was already contaminated (a good assumption that haz-mat pros make: contamination has spread much farther and faster than you think possible).

What they did right
Okay, so people make mistakes. This isn't an excuse but since it happens all the time it's gratifying to see openness, apologies, and responsibility taken compared to the usual denial, defense, stonewall approach. The acting director made no excuses; NIST has already changed its safety training and emergency resonse prodecures, including getting outside evaluators to help. The director also shut down all radioactive work at Boulder immediately. Most importantly, NIST has been, my all accounts, very open with the public and the local community.

This isn't to say this shouldn't have been prevented. It should have. Somewhere around 20% of the sample isn't in the lab; it's in the public sewer, the people in the lab, the air, ETC. It was a collosal screw-up for a place that is supposed to know how to handle radioactive substances and take appropriate action in the event of an accident. NIST was 0-2 in this incident.

A good thing to come out of this is that because of NIST's transparency and acceptance of help, the problems will get fixed, and that's what really matters. Organizations should think of this the next time someone fires off a critique. If it has some truth, it's easier to simply take it and say 'you're right, what can we do to fix this' than to get defensive. For one, it kinda takes the wind out of the sails of the angry advisary. Two, it allows you to get some help in fixing what you probably already knew was a problem instead of tring to fix it on the sly while denying it exists.


*Why do all the reports continually refer to the guest as a "foreign guest researcher"? Is that pertinent? Dang foreigners.

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